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I. INTRODUCTION
Amazon.com revealed a capacity for irony when it remotely deleted
certain copies of George Orwell's 1984 and Animal Farm from its Kindle
e-book readers in 2009.' In response, two users filed a class action lawsuit
* J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law, December 2010; B.A. in Latin and
Classical Studies, Purdue University, 2008. The Author would like to thank the members of
the Federal Communications Law Journal who helped prepare this Note for publication.
1. The Kindle Content Deletion Flap: Predictions on How Amazon.com Will Respond
to the Newly-Filed Class Action, JUSTIA.COM (Aug. 3, 2009, 3:43 PM),
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against Amazon.com.2 Among several causes of action, the plaintiffs
claimed that Amazon.com had violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
of 1986 (CFAA) by causing harm to their Kindles without authorization.
The lawsuit is one example of the ways that the CFAA has grown since it
was enacted. The Gawronski lawsuit is a useful case study that shows why
the expansion of the CFAA is a good thing for consumers, and why recent
restrictions on the Act should not prevent lawsuits like the one Justin
Gawronski brought against Amazon.com.
In recent years, the CFAA has been criticized as too expansive.s What
started as a law to prevent hackers from harming federal computer systems
has grown to encompass behavior that is not typically considered hacking.
For example, the CFAA is now commonly used in private civil claims of
employers against employees who use work computers for unauthorized
purposes.6 The CFAA has strayed far from its original purpose, causing a
rise in federal litigation that would not otherwise exist.7 Recent cases that
curtailed employers' remedies for disloyal employees, along with one that
declined to extend criminal penalties to a breach of a website's terms of
service, mark the beginning of a move toward reining in the scope of the
CFAA.8 In many areas, the new judicial restraint may be justified.9 But the
civil causes of action arising under the CFAA deter some behavior that
should be curtailed, like Amazon.com's unauthorized deletion of e-books.
A powerful CFAA can protect consumers from one-sided licensing
deals like the purchase of e-books. One of the CFAA's unique benefits over
alternative causes of action, like trespass to chattels, is that it creates
uniform treatment for Internet-based contracts because the federal system
has greater potential for uniformity than state law. The CFAA also has the
conceptual advantage of conceiving of e-book ownership as a bargained-for
set of rights in a file, not as personal property in the same way that physical
http://blawgsearch.justia.com/blawgpost/2009/08/03/kindle-content-deletion-flap-
[hereinafter Content Deletion Flap).
2. Id; Complaint, Gawronski v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C09-1084-JCC (W.D. Wash.
July 30, 2009), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/washington/wawdce/2:2009cv01084/161529/1/.
3. Complaint, supra note 2, at paras. 50-57.
4. See generally Sarah Boyer, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Abusing Federal
Jurisdiction?, 6 RUTGERS. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 661 (2009).
5. See, e.g., id. at 662.
6. Id. at 670.
7. See id. at 662-63.
8. Jacqui Cheng, Disloyal Employees Are Not Hackers, Says Court, ARS TECHNICA
(Sept. 18, 2009, 1:19 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/09/disloyal-
employees-are-not-hackers-says-court.ars?utm source=rss&utm medium=rss&utm
campaign=rss; United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
9. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 8.
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books are property.'o This concept more accurately reflects the reality of
the e-book market than do alternative causes of action. Instead of
categorically restricting the CFAA to cover only hacking, the CFAA should
continue to apply to devices like the Kindle. Any future judicial or statutory
restraints on the statute should not constrain e-book purchasers' ability to
use the statute to protect themselves from the licensors of e-book files. In
addition, a revision of the CFAA expressly creating a cause of action for
tethered e-book readers should be added.
II. THE GA WRONSKI SETTLEMENT
A. The Amazon Kindle
The Amazon Kindle is a handheld wireless device that displays
electronic books that have been purchased from Amazon.com's online
Kindle Store." Amazon's Whispernet, the network that tethers the e-reader
to Amazon.com and allows downloading of e-books, is accessible from any
Kindle without extra fees.' 2 Amazon.com also created a free software
download for PC that displays Kindle e-books for those who want to read
e-books on a traditional computer screen.'3
The Amazon Kindle has become one of the most popular devices in
consumer electronics.14 Amazon.com announced that the Kindle was its
most popular gift item during the 2009 holiday season and that sales of e-
books surpassed sales of traditional paper books for the first time in the few
days following December 25, 2009.'1 Kindle e-book files prevent users
from sharing or transferring the files in ways that violate the Amazon
Kindle User Agreement.16 The Kindle's popularity has caused several
10. Cf Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: Amazon "Kindles" the Copy
Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147 (2009) (conceiving of the issue as a
dichotomy between e-books as sales or e-books as licenses, preferring, in the end, sales).
I1. Kindle Wireless Reading Device, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Kindle-
Wireless-Reading-Display-Generation/dp/BO02Y27P3M/ref=samenu_kdp3w3 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011); Amazon.com: Kindle Store, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/kindle-
store-ebooks-newspapers-blogs/b/ref-topnav storetabkinh?ie=UTF8&node=133141011
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
12. See Kindle (Latest Generation) License Agreement and Terms of Use,
AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/helplcustomer/display.html?nodeld=200505590
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
13. Kindle Wireless Reading Device, supra note 11.
14. Katie Allen, Amazon e-Book Sales Overtake Print for First Time, GUARDIAN.CO.UK
(Dec. 28, 2009, 7:29 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/dec/28/amazon-ebook-
kindle-sales-surge.
15. Id.
16. Amazon Kindle: License Agreement and Terms of Use, AMAZON.COM,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeld=200144530 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Terms of Use].
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competitors to release their own e-readers, most notably the Sony Reader
and the Barnes & Noble NOOK.'7 Competing models and stores operate in
essentially the same way as the Kindle.
B. The Gawronski Complaint and Settlement
In July 2009, Kindle owners booted up their e-readers only to see that
their copies of George Orwell's 1984 and Animal Farm had been remotely
deleted from their systems." Certain works of Ayn Rand went missing as
well.'9 Other than providing a refund for the missing books, Amazon.com
refused to explain the deletions, but later admitted that it had removed the
e-books because of copyright problems. 2 0 According to a statement later
made by Amazon.com, the particular e-books had come from Canada,
where copyright protection lasts for the life of the author plus fifty years.2'
Orwell's books are public domain in Canada; however, they were still
under copyright in the United States, where copyright protection lasts 95
years after the publication date for works published before 1978.22 If the
copyright owner had brought suit against Amazon.com, the company could
have faced anywhere between $750 and $150,000 in statutory damages for
each infringing work.2 3 Once Amazon.com realized its mistake, it
immediately stopped selling the e-books in its Kindle Store and retrieved
the copies it had already sold.2 4 Amazon.com employees remotely accessed
the Kindles of each person who had bought the offending e-books and
deleted the files, immediately reimbursing the purchase price of the book.25
In response, two plaintiffs, Justin Gawronski and Antoine Bruguier,
brought a class action lawsuit against Amazon.com in the United States
District Court in the Western District of Washington on July 30, 2009.26
The plaintiffs claimed that Amazon.com harmed them by taking away their
property-the e-book files-and also claimed that they had lost valuable
electronic marginal notes (such as "remember this paragraph for your
thesis"), which were useless without the corresponding files.27 The
17. See NOOK, BARNES & NOBLE, http://www.barnesandnoble.com/nook/index.asp
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011); see also Reader, SONY, http://ebookstore.sony.com/reader/ (last
visited Feb. 22, 2011).
18. Complaint, supra note 2, at paras. 1-2.
19. Id. at para. 17.
20. Michael D. Scott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow ... Thanks to DRM, CYBERSPACE
LAW, Sept. 2009.
21. Id.
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1-2).
24. Scott, supra note 20.
25. Id.
26. Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 84.
27. David Johnson, Kindle Class Action Settlement: Gawronski v. Amazon Suit
[Vol. 63538
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complaint alleged that Amazon.com had breached its own terms of service
by deleting the files.28 The complaint also claimed trespass to chattels and a
violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.2 9 The plaintiffs identified
three classes in the lawsuit: the Kindle Class, which includes all owners of
the Kindle, Kindle 2, or Kindle DX; the Big Brother Class, which includes
all individuals who had an e-book deleted by Amazon.com; and the Big
Brother Work-Product Subclass, which includes anyone who had made
marginal notes on an e-book that Amazon.com had deleted.30
A few weeks before the settlement on September 3, 2009,
Amazon.com had announced that affected users could either replace the
book with an identical copy that did not violate the Copyright Act or
receive thirty dollars from Amazon.com. 3 I Amazon.com reached a
settlement with the plaintiffs on September 25, 2009.32 The settlement was
with the two named plaintiffs only, Gawronski and Bruguier, not the entire
affected class-the remaining class members therefore still have standing
to sue Amazon.com on related grounds.33 In the settlement, Amazon.com
agreed to restore marginal notes for all affected users who had made notes
on their previous copies of the deleted books.34 Amazon.com also agreed
that, for all books purchased under the original Terms of Use, which
granted
the Kindle purchaser the "non-exclusive right to keep a permanent
copy" of each purchased Work and to "view, use and display [such
Works] an unlimited number of times, solely on the [Devices] ... and
solely for [the purchasers'] personal, non-commercial use," it will not
remotely delete or modify these books from Kindle devices purchased
or being used in the U.S.35
There were, however, some exceptions to the settlement:
Under the settlement, Amazon retains the right to continue to
unilaterally delete books from Kindle devices if: (a) the user consents,
(b) the user requests a refund or fails to pay for the book, (c) a judicial
or regulatory order requires deletion, or (d) deletion or modification is
Regarding Amazon.com's Removal of Orwell Works from Kindle Devices Settles, but Leaves
Many Questions, DIGITAL MEDIA LAWYER BLOG (Sept. 29, 2009),
http://www.digitalmedialawyerblog.com/2009/09/gawronski_v_amazoncomtheclas 1.ht
ml [hereinafter Johnson, Class Action Settlement]; see also Complaint, supra note 2, at para.
54; Scott, supra note 20, at para. 8.
28. Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 49.
29. Id. at paras. 50-57.
30. Id. at paras. 53-54.
31. Johnson, Class Action Settlement, supra note 27.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Terms of Use, supra note 16).
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necessary to protect the user, the Kindle device or Amazon's network.
In addition, Amazon agreed to pay a $150,000 fee to the plaintiffs'
counsel, which in turn agreed to "donate a portion of that fee to a
charitable organization that promotes literacy, children's issues,
secondary or post-secondary education, health or job placement."
Faced with the risk of paying damages to a large class of its
customers, Amazon.com also suffered a media backlash." Blogs and news
articles (and the complaint itself) pointed to the Big Brother-like deletion.38
The invasiveness of the deletion seemed to irk Kindle users more than a
simple breach of contract would have, especially since Amazon.com had
already refunded the purchase price of the books by the time the story had
attracted much attention." The realization that Kindle e-books were unlike
traditional paper books seemed to be sinking in; the Kindle is not a private
bookshelf unreachable by the seller, but is in fact a device constantly
tethered to an online seller.4 0 A tethered device allows the seller much
greater access to its goods than that to which many people are accustomed.
Devices like the Kindle, assuming their popularity will continue as their
prices drop and their availability rises, raise new legal issues for book
buyers and are changing not only the way people read books, but also the
way people own books. Applying the CFAA to unauthorized use of
tethered devices could help regulate behavior and protect people's rights as
book owners.
C. Historical Background: Expansion and Restriction of the CFAA
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 198641 was originally
designed to impose criminal penalties on computer hackers who caused
harm to federally owned computers, but the statute has been amended
multiple times since 1986.42 Today, the CFAA prohibits unauthorized
access to "protected computers," which includes any computer connected
to the Internet or any computer that has moved in interstate commerce.4 3
Perhaps the most significant amendment to the CFAA inserted a provision
that created a private cause of action in addition to the already-existing
criminal penalties.44 This private cause of action is the one used in the
Gawronski suit.
36. Id. (quoting Terms of Use, supra note 16).
37. See, e.g., Content Deletion Flap, supra note 1.
38. See, e.g., id.; Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 3.
39. See Johnson, Class Action Settlement, supra note 27.
40. Scott, supra note 20.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
42. Boyer, supra note 4, at 665-66.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2).
44. Id. at § 1030(g).
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A cause of action brought under the CFAA requires a showing of
damage and Ioss. 4 5 Damage is "any impairment to the integrity or
availability of data, a program, a system, or information," while loss
includes any reasonable cost to the plaintiff, "including the cost of
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring"
the damaged system to its prior condition.46 Loss also can include "any
revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred
because of interruption of service."47 This broad definition of loss is
significant because anyone bringing a civil action may obtain damages only
if he or she can show one of the following: loss of at least $5,000 per year,
medical harm, physical injury, threat to public health or safety, or damage
to a government computer.48 Since the calculation of loss can include
damage assessments, which are easy to incur after the fact for the sole
purpose of bringing suit, this requirement is easy to meet.
The civil provisions of the CFAA have been used primarily by
employers attempting to block employees and former employees from
using company data to start competing companies or sell company data to
competitors.49 Many of these suits could have been handled under
traditional contract law in state court, but the plaintiffs have used the
CFAA as a way to move into federal court.50 Recently, however, courts
have tried to reduce the scope of the CFAA. For example, in LVRC
Holdings LLC v. Brekka, the Ninth Circuit declined to hold that a former
employee was acting "without authorization" when he e-mailed his
employer's financial statements to his home computer and later used those
statements to start a competing company.5' According to the court, because
the employee was using his own password and credentials to log in to the
company computer, he was acting with authorization and could not be held
liable under the CFAA.s2
The CFAA's criminal cause of action has also been restricted as part
of the general trend. The defendant in the highly publicized cyberbullying
case United States v. Drew, also known as the "MySpace Mom" case, was
acquitted in 2009 via a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.5 3 The
45. Id.
46. Id. at § 1030(e)(8), (11).
47. Id. at § 1030(e)(11).
48. Id. at § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i); § 1030(g).
49. Boyer, supra note 4, at 670.
50. See id.
51. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009); Cheng,
supra note 8.
52. LVRC Holdings, 581 F.3d at 1133, 1135; Cheng, supra note 8.
53. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Lori Drew created a false
profile on the social networking website MySpace.com. Id. at 452. Pretending to be a
541Number 2]
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prosecution in Drew argued that an intentional breach of a website's user
agreement, which prohibited the creation of a false profile, amounted to a
criminal violation of the CFAA.54 The court refused to extend criminal
penalties to a violation of a website's terms of service, reasoning that the
prosecution's theory of the case far surpassed the original purpose of the
CFAA-namely, to prevent hackers from damaging computer systems.ss
Like the prosecutors in the Drew case, the Gawronski plaintiffs were
also asking a court to apply the CFAA to a defendant who is not a typical
hacker. However, Amazon.com as a defendant caused damage that was
more like the anticipated harm from a hacker than the harm Drew caused.
While the CFAA has been rightly restricted in some contexts, like cyber-
bullying, the restrictions need not extend to any activity that was not
strictly contemplated by the original drafters of the statute. In fact, the
CFAA gives some plaintiffs benefits that other causes of action do not.
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CFAA OVER OTHER REMEDIES
The plaintiffs in Gawronski listed several causes of action in addition
to the CFAA, including breach of contract, violation of a Washington
consumer protection law, and trespass to chattels. Critics of the modem
CFAA have said that it is being used to cover too many situations, and that
it amounts to an abuse of federal jurisdiction when plaintiffs use it as an
excuse to get out of state court and into federal court.5 As this Note will
show, the CFAA is a useful cause of action in cases like Gawronski, more
so than the other remedies available to plaintiffs.
A. Analysis of Gawronski's CFAA Claim on the Merits
First, it is important to show as a threshold matter that the plaintiffs
would have been likely to succeed on their CFAA claim. In essence,
Amazon.com would have likely lost on the merits of the CFAA cause of
action because the plaintiffs could have proved that Amazon.com acted
without authorization when it deleted the e-books. The Terms of Use
guaranteeing a permanent copy would be proof of the bounds of
teenage boy, Drew communicated with her daughter's classmate, Megan Meier, who had
not been getting along with Drew's daughter. Id. Drew made Meier believe that the
fictitious boy liked her, and then made her believe that the boy had lost interest in her by
saying "the world would be a better place without her . . . ." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). Meier committed suicide shortly afterward. Id. Technically, Drew had not
committed a crime other than possibly a violation of the CFAA. Id at 451.
54. Id. at 451, 467.
55. Id at 461, 465.
56. Complaint, supra note 2, at paras. 50-83.
57. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 4, at 670-71.
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Amazon.com's authorization to access users' Kindles. 8 Although the
plaintiffs would have had to prove that they had incurred a loss of $5,000,
they (and future potential plaintiffs) could meet this requirement because
the CFAA has such a broad definition for "loss." In particular, the
complaint alleges the following:
Amazon violated 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) by knowingly causing
the transmission of a command to delete content to Plaintiffs' Kindles,
which are protected computers as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B)
because they are used in interstate commerce and/or communication.
By deleting content from Plaintiffs' Kindles by way of remote
deletion, Amazon intentionally caused damage without authorization to
Plaintiffs' Kindles. . . . Amazon violated 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii)
by intentionally accessing Plaintiffs' Kindles, protected computers,
without authorization, and as a result, caused damage to Plaintiffs'
Kindles by remotely deleting content stored on them.59
Amazon.com has publicly admitted to removing particular e-books from
users' devices, as asserted by the plaintiffs, so the plaintiffs would have
been able to prove at least that much of a CFAA claim.60 One potential
sticking point for the court may have been whether a Kindle was in fact a
computer as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1), which defines a computer
as "an electronic . . . device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage
functions . . . but such term does not include an automated typewriter or
4,1
typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device.
Amazon.com may have been able to argue, therefore, that Kindle is more
like a calculator than a computer, given that it does not have a full
computer's functions, but that argument likely would not have succeeded.
Because Kindles are sophisticated enough to have a web browser, limited
word processing functions for marginal notes, and the ability to download
and store files, the Kindle is more like a computer than a calculator.
For the damages requirement, the CFAA requires plaintiffs to prove a
loss of at least $5,000 to recover under the Act.62 The plaintiffs' argument
is split here between the two specific plaintiffs and two different classes of
plaintiffs:
Plaintiffs and Big Brother Class members suffered damages even
though Amazon refunded the cost of the purchased content to Plaintiff
and Big Brother Class members because: 1) they now have to replace
the deleted content at a higher cost; and, 2) their Kindles were reduced
in value by way of the deletion in that an electronic reading device that
enables Amazon to remotely delete content is less valuable than one
not subject to unconsented remote deletions of content.
58. Terms of Use, supra note 16.
59. Complaint, supra note 2, at paras. 51-52.
60. Johnson, Class Action Settlement, supra note 27.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (2006).
62. Id. at § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i).
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Plaintiff Gawronski and the Big Brother Work-Product Subclass
suffered damages because they created content on their Kindles within
the purchased content that Amazon deleted. The remote deletions
rendered their work-product useless and worthless because their work-
product necessarily was linked to the deleted purchased content. As a
result, Plaintiff Gawronski and the Big Brother Work-Product Subclass
must expend further resources and effort in order to recreate their now
useless work-product.
As a result of these takings, Amazon's conduct has caused a loss to
one or more persons during any one-year period aggregating at least
$5,000 in value in real economic damages.6
Loss is defined in the statute as,
any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to
an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data ...
or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of
interruption of service ... .
The plaintiffs and the Big Brother Class claimed damages because they had
to replace the deleted content at a higher cost because, presumably, the
refund is less than the purchase price they would pay at an American-
owned e-store where the copyright on Orwell's work is still valid. This
difference in price fits clearly within the CFAA's definition of loss, as it
represents the cost incurred by restoring the data to its prior state, but the
loss in value of their devices is harder to evaluate. The difference in value
between a Kindle that ensures permanent copies and one that does not
make that guarantee is a subjective value, or is at least difficult to
determine. Recalling that only aggregate loss matters under the statute, the
$5,000 threshold seems within reach for a lawsuit with such a large class.
The aggregate value of the e-books would likely succeed $5,000 in
purchase price alone. The marginal notes would likewise have value, even
though it would be subjective and difficult to measure, but even a nominal
amount spread across a class would likely reach $5,000. The Gawronski
plaintiffs would have, in all likelihood, been able to make a solid prima
facie case for a CFAA violation.
B. Comparison of the CFAA Claim and Other Remedies
The CFAA has several advantages over other available remedies.
First, because the federal system has greater potential for uniformity than
state law does, the CFAA allows for more uniform treatment of Internet-
based contracts. Compared to trespass to chattels, the CFAA more
accurately reflects the reality of the e-book market-the CFAA has the
conceptual advantage of conceiving of e-book ownership as a bargained-for
63. Complaint, supra note 2, at paras. 53-55.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1 1).
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set of rights in a file, not as personal property in the form of physical
books. A too-broad limitation on the CFAA would deprive plaintiffs of the
remedies the CFAA affords them. A revision of the CFAA expressly
creating a cause of action for Internet-based contracts, like the one
Amazon.com has with its Kindle, should be added. Such a revision would
be a suitable middle-ground that would allow for restrictions to the CFAA
in areas like employment law but would preserve the protections for
circumstances like those in the Gawronski complaint.
1. Breach of Contract and State Law
The Amazon.com Terms of Use is a contract that governs the user's
rights in his or her e-books.6 ' The Gawronski complaint alleged breach of
contract because in the Kindle's Terms of Use, Amazon.com had granted
Kindle users a permanent copy of their e-books." Such a contract claim,
without the accompanying CFAA cause of action, would have been tried in
a Washington court. The breach of contract claim, whether in state or
federal court, would likely have had the same result. Because the language
in the Terms of Use did not provide Amazon.com a right to delete
purchased books from the devices, Amazon.com's conduct amounted to a
breach of contract. Both federal and state courts would have come to the
same conclusion.
Expecting users to resolve their disputes regarding Internet contracts
for e-books in state court creates the problem of lack of predictability.
Uniformity is one advantage that the CFAA lends to lawsuits related to e-
book readers. Because the CFAA allows plaintiffs who have a dispute
involving unauthorized access to their computers to move into federal
court, the CFAA makes it easier for both users and companies who sell
tethered devices to understand the rules of their dealings. Specifically, the
CFAA could provide a clear, uniform rule that no unauthorized access
would be permitted to any tethered device. Such a federal law would
prevent the company from taking advantage of any specialized state rules
that may be difficult for an individual user to discover-for example, a
state rule that inferred authorization so long as the users were compensated
for a deleted file. That type of state rule, if given time to develop in a
particular jurisdiction, could add a hidden term into an otherwise
transparent contract. The problem would be complicated if there were
many different e-book stores online, so that a user could potentially be
agreeing to contracts governed by several different state contract laws.
While such a system would still be workable, having a strong federal rule
governing Internet transactions makes it easier for an Internet user to
65. Terms of Use, supra note 16.
66. Complaint, supra note 2, at paras. 46-49.
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understand exactly what laws apply to a transaction. Admittedly, circuit
splits could cause unpredictability, but not to as great an extent as with
state law. In any event, plaintiffs could move into federal court anyway
using diversity jurisdiction, since most users would not live in the same
states as the companies. For Internet contracts especially, then, federal laws
may be the best way to regulate companies' behavior.
The same reasoning applies to the cause of action for violation of
Washington state law. The Gawronski complaint alleges a violation of the
Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), which provides that "
[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce are . .. unlawful."68 The existence of
such a law is not guaranteed in all jurisdictions, and a company might draft
its contract so as to be governed by the laws of a less consumer-friendly
state. The availability of a federal cause of action ensures that an Internet
user has a better idea of what remedies are available to him or her. The user
will be able to draw upon various state remedies, but no matter what, the
federal law will still apply and be available as well.
Of course, the CFAA is effective in preventing abuse by e-book
companies and other companies that offer tethered devices only to the
extent that accessing and deleting files on the tethered devices is
unauthorized by the contract. In the Gawronski case, Amazon.com's Terms
of Use unambiguously offered a permanent copy. But there is nothing that
prevents Amazon.com or other tethered-device companies from contracting
around the problem in the future. Although Amazon.com has since
announced that it will not delete e-books in the same manner again, it has
reserved the right to delete e-books if it deems the deletion necessary to
protect its network.
Essentially, Amazon.com's promise not to delete e-books from users'
Kindles applies only to circumstances similar to those in the Gawronski
case. In its settlement, Amazon.com reserved its right to delete e-books if it
deems the deletion necessary.70 Furthermore, Amazon.com can change its
Terms of Use in the future to allow deletion of e-books that have copyright
problems, as could other competing companies like Barnes & Noble.As a
result, the CFAA's main weakness in the e-book reader scenario is that
companies can easily draft contracts around the problem by writing express
67. Id. at paras. 77-83.
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (West 1961).
69. Peter Kafka, Amazon: We Won't Delete Your Kindle Books Unless We Need to
Delete Your Books, ALL THINGS DIGITAL (Oct. 1, 2009, 8:10 AM),
http://mediamemo.allthingsd.com/20091001/amazon-we-wont-delete-your-kindle-books-
unless-we-need-to-delete-your-books/?mod=ATD sphere.
70. Johnson, Class Action Settlement, supra note 27 (citing Terms of Use, supra note
16).
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authorization into the contracts. To the consumer, purchasing an e-book
seems to be largely the same experience as purchasing a physical book; the
final product-certain words on a page or screen-is the same regardless of
how it is displayed. But purchasing e-books in an online store is different
from buying physical books at a store. In a physical bookstore, there is no
written contract, only an oral agreement at the point of sale. Consumer
rights in that book are governed by the UCC and federal copyright law.7 1
Most stores allow returns, and the likelihood of litigation is very low.
Furthermore, owners of physical books are able to resell their books in a
secondary market under the "first sale" doctrine.72 In contrast, Kindle
customers are not owners of books at all, but licensees bound by the Kindle
Terms of Use.73 Most Internet users do not read the full terms of use in
online contracts, even though those agreements are, for the most part,
binding. Because the user is less likely to read and understand the contract,
it is easy for companies to draft the contracts in ways unduly favorable to
them. Many companies, when drafting the contracts, have the ability to
select and designate a venue or governing state rules that the user is not in
any position to bargain for or against.
This Note proposes that the CFAA should be expanded in part,
especially if it is curtailed in other areas, like employer-employee disputes.
For example, Congress could add a definition for tethered devices so that it
includes devices like the Kindle and the NOOK. The amendment could
simultaneously create a separate cause of action for deleting files contained
on the device without express consent. The CFAA could require renewed
consent for each file and ban a blanket authorization by contract.
Such an amendment to the statute would have certain advantages.
Most important, it would protect users' property rights in their e-books.
Cementing property rights in an electronic medium is especially important
because most electronic media are dispensed over the Internet by large
companies like Amazon.com. A typical Internet user has almost no
bargaining power compared to Amazon.com or Barnes & Noble. It would
be all too easy for large, web-based companies to create a "Big Brother"
custom where books can be deleted at the whim of the sellers, so long as
such a blanket provision was in their terms of service. Preempting the
71. Seringhaus, supra note 10, at 150.
72. Id. at 160.
73. Id. at 149-51. Seringhaus argues that e-book transactions, though stylized as
licenses, should be reinterpreted by courts as sales. Id. This issue has not gone before courts.
Amazon.com would certainly prefer to keep the transactions categorized as licenses because
that categorization preserves its ability to delete e-books or block users from purchased
content as it deems necessary. Either way, the CFAA would still apply to Kindle
transactions because the CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to the Kindle device, rather
than the e-books stored on the devices.
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dangers of new technology is in the spirit of the original CFAA, which was
created because of fears related to computer hackers. Today, people might
more likely be afraid of the abuses of powerful companies.
This dystopian possibility is real enough in consumers' eyes, hence
the media backlash from Amazon.com's actions. If Amazon.com had
accidentally sold a different, less dystopian book-say, a Harlequin
romance-without the proper copyright permission and then deleted it,
there is a significant chance that the deletion would not have made news at
all. Amazon.com had compensated the users, after all, and the most loss
any person experienced was missing marginal notes. The unlucky
coincidence that it was George Orwell's work that was deleted touched on
a raw nerve that elevated the problem from economics to a matter of
principle.
2. Trespass to Chattels
The increasing use of computers in the 1990s led to an expansion of
the common law doctrine of trespass to chattels to create civil liability for
causing harm through unauthorized use of computers. Originally, trespass
to chattels (commonly known as "conversion's little brother") was an
infrequently used doctrine that provided a remedy for interference with
chattels that caused harm, but not enough harm to constitute conversion.
Unlike trespass to real property, a prima facie case for trespass to chattels
requires actual harm to the chattel; unlike conversion, a person liable for
trespass to chattels owes only actual damages, not the full value of the
chattel.76
To prove a trespass to chattels case, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant intentionally dispossessed another person of the chattel, or used
or intermeddled with a chattel in another's possession." "Intermeddling"
means intentionally causing physical contact.78 The plaintiff must prove
that he or she suffered damage because of one of the following: the plaintiff
was dispossessed of the chattel; the chattel's condition, quality, or value
was impaired; the plaintiff was deprived of the use of the chattel for a
substantial time period; or the plaintiff suffered bodily harm or harm to
some person or thing in which the plaintiff has a legally protected
interest.7 9 Finally, the intermeddling must be more than nominal.
74. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet:
The Real Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REv. 265, 266-69 (2006).
75. Id. at 279.
76. Id. at 279-80.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217.
78. Id. at cmt. e.
79. Id. at § 218.
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The elements of a trespass to chattels claim as applied to computers
began to change with the case eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., in which
the court considered the risk of future potential harm when analyzing the
severity of the intermeddling.8 ' Defendant Bidder's Edge was using a
software robot to continuously search eBay to populate an auction
aggregation site.82 eBay asked Bidder's Edge to stop the continuous
searching, and eBay also attempted to block the robots, but Bidder's Edge
used proxy servers to bypass the IP address blocks.83 Bidder's Edge is
significant for two reasons: first, the court found that although websites are
open to the public, Bidder's Edge acted without authorization because
eBay's physical servers were private property-chattels-with which
Bidder's Edge had interfered; and second, the court found that Bidder's
Edge had proximately damaged eBay's chattels by using some of the
server's resources as bandwidth." The court admitted that Bidder's Edge
did not harm or noticeably slow eBay's system, but more than nominal
damage would have occurred if other companies had decided to join
Bidder's Edge in continually crawling eBay's website." This holding
expanded the common law trespass to chattels doctrine because now
nominal damage was sufficient, so long as the plaintiff could invoke the
fear of encouraging others to copy the defendant. Because the court
considered possible future harm, the threshold for damage in trespass to
chattels cases was, by that time, almost nonexistent.
This low threshold for damage allowed the Gawronski plaintiffs to
add trespass to chattels as one of their causes of action. Even if they could
not prove later on that they had suffered $5,000 worth of damage-as
required to recover under the CFAA-they could at least advance a
trespass theory. Furthermore, there is a possibility that trespass to chattels
as redefined in Bidder's Edge could include more than just the value of the
single missing e-book and the loss of the marginal notes. The future
potential harm calculation from Bidder's Edge could give plaintiffs more
than actual damages; it could include the value of loss from future potential
deletions. However, this extra benefit is unlikely because the Gawronski
facts are based on a loss of a particular file, not from use of system
resources.
The tort case for the Gawronski plaintiffs would likely succeed. The
80. Id. at cmt. e.
81. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
82. Id. at 1060-62.
83. Id. at 1062-63.
84. Id. at 1071-72.
85. Id.
86. See id.
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plaintiffs could easily prove that Amazon.com intentionally dispossessed
the plaintiffs of the chattel (the e-book). Under that theory, though, the
status of the marginal notes is not as certain as it would be under a breach
of contract or a CFAA claim. The value of the marginal notes could be
either a user modification to the e-book that increased the chattel's value,
or it could be a separate chattel all on its own as a separate user file. Under
the latter theory, the marginal notes would have been "intermeddled with"
rather than dispossessed, because the notes remained on the Kindle but
were useless without context. Either way, the plaintiffs likely could
establish a prima facie case for trespass to chattels.
Trespass to chattels as a remedy for unauthorized deletions from a
tethered device is susceptible to the same problems as state-based contract
claims. The common law nature of tort remedies means that different
jurisdictions may treat trespass to chattels differently. One court may
decide that the common law requirement of actual damage to a device
should apply to tethered devices. How much damage must be done to a
device, and what exactly constitutes damage, are also variables subject to
reinterpretation by state courts. For example, one court could reasonably
hold that deletion of a single file with immediate, reasonable compensation
is merely nominal damage, while another could reasonably conclude that
the same action is actual damage to a chattel. The distinction could turn on
what exactly the court determines to be the chattel. If the chattel is the
device, then a compensated deletion could seem minor, but if the chattel is
determined to be the e-book file itself, then the damage seems more
significant. There could be uncertainties in a single jurisdiction where the
issue has not been decided, and also uncertainties between jurisdictions
when an Internet user does not have the resources or bargaining power to
predict or control the eventual venue of a dispute.
As discussed above, a further amendment to the CFAA that expands
the statute to explicitly cover tethered devices like e-readers would bring
the statute more in line with current technology. The CFAA was not
designed with Kindles or other tethered devices in mind, but fixing an
outdated statute by amending it to cover new technology seems a better
solution than stripping the CFAA of its current uses and focusing solely on
hacking. While hacking remains a concern, new technology has emerged
such that consumer rights are now a matter pressing on the public's
consciousness. An expanded statute would be able to better protect
consumers who face technologies that offer limited rights in media.
Similarly, trespass to chattels was designed to cover personal property
before computer files existed, so its underlying rationale does not
necessarily apply to virtual property. Courts' reinterpretation of the old
doctrine, as in Bidder's Edge, shows that new technology has changed the
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meaning of chattel. Or, more accurately, courts have changed the doctrine
to remedy inequities for which there was no appropriate modem relief.
Rather than twisting an almost-forgotten tort to protect consumers of a new
device, amending the CFAA is a better, more thoughtful response because
drafting legislation gives Congress more control over how the law will be
applied. Allowing new doctrines to develop in the common law could lead
to different results in different jurisdictions. A differing jurisdictional
approach has little to do with the average Internet user's expectations that
the law will apply similarly to contracts with Amazon.com and with Barnes
& Noble.
Significantly, the CFAA has a conceptual advantage over trespass to
chattels, because it better mirrors how the market currently treats e-books.
This is because trespass to chattels does not quite conceptually fit what is
happening when someone accesses a computer without authorization and
deletes a file. Trespass to chattels, as mentioned, requires the chattel itself
to be harmed, and it is not even clear whether a file will be considered a
chattel-as a physical book would be. Intel Corporation v. Hamidi made it
clear that harm to a particular chattel is required for the tort." In Hamidi,
the harm a former employee did to a company was harm to the company,
not to the physical computers. 8 In the context of e-books, the only thing
that is inarguably a chattel is the device itself, not the file. Deleting a file
does not necessarily physically damage a computer.
The problem with what Amazon.com did to its Kindle users was that
it accessed the Kindles and changed content without the users' consent.
The concept behind the CFAA is that two parties assign each other a set of
permissions, and the parties must abide by those permissions. Any
unauthorized access that does enough harm may give rise to a civil cause of
action. The key is that the CFAA treats e-books as a nexus of different
rights: the company reserves the right to remove the e-book if it is not paid
for, and the user retains the right to a permanent copy so long as it is paid
for. Users may think of the books as their "personal property" in the same
way that they may think of books on their shelves as personal property,
thus subject to the doctrine of trespass to chattels. But tethered devices are
sui generis because they operate by giving users permission to view a file,
not by actually allowing a user to physically possess the product.
The "permissions" treatment of e-books under the CFAA is more in
line with the legal landscape of e-books. This parallel makes the CFAA a
useful remedy because it conceptually fits the problem. While the
Gawronski plaintiffs certainly had a strong chance of succeeding on a
trespass to chattels claim, the CFAA more accurately reflects the legal
87. Intel Corp. v. Hanidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003).
8 8. Id.
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status of e-books. Any revision of the CFAA should explicitly account for
e-books as something valuable to protect.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the dispute quickly settled, the Gawronski lawsuit remains a
useful case study that shows why applying the CFAA to situations
involving e-books is important to protect consumers. It is enlightening to
examine this case because the CFAA has been criticized as too expansive.
The original intent of the CFAA was to prevent hackers from harming
federal computer systems, but now it is applied to many different
situations, including employment suits. Recently, courts have begun to
restrict the CFAA to return the statute to its original purpose-but courts
should be careful not to go too far. If the CFAA were appropriately
amended, it could not only avoid such restrictive intrepretations by courts,
but it also has the potential to protect consumers from one-sided licensing
deals like those found in the current e-books market.
As it currently exists, the CFAA provides several advantages to
consumers that other causes of action do not. First, the CFAA provides a
way for consumers to access federal courts, which can ensure a more
uniform treatment of Internet-based contracts than does state law. The
CFAA also has the conceptual advantage of conceiving of e-book
ownership as a bargained-for set of rights in a file, not personal property in
the same way that physical books are property. This concept more
accurately reflects the reality of the e-book market than common law
approaches.
To take further advantage of these benefits, a revision of the CFAA
expressly creating a cause of action for tethered e-book readers should be
added. Such an amendment would prevent companies from attempting to
contract around the CFAA. Furthermore, allowing plaintiffs to use the
CFAA in e-book suits would ensure that the interpretation of contracts
governing e-book purchases would not unreasonably favor the rights of the
seller over those of the e-book purchaser.
Technology is always changing, and the law must stay ahead of the
curve, or, at the very least, try to keep up. The Gawronski complaint and
other cases show that the CFAA, much more recently developed than
trespass to chattels, is much more useful to consumers of modem
technology. However, even the CFAA significantly predates the advent of
tethered devices such as e-book readers, and could therefore use some
amending to better apply to instances like Amazon.com's Orwellian
deletions and similar problems that may arise in the near future.
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